EUROCAE has released ER-037 | Industry Guidance to consider IHA in aircraft/systems development and safety assessment processes. This document offers practical recommendations for applying Intrinsic Hazard Analysis (IHA) early in the development of aircraft and complex systems, particularly valuable for teams working on novel technologies such as UAS, eVTOL, and AI-enabled systems. Early IHA supports effective risk identification when design flexibility is greatest, helping de-risk development and build safer systems from day one.

In the world of airborne electronics, the distinction between simple and complex hardware is more than a technical formality, it directly impacts how systems are designed, verified, and certified. At IDA, understanding this distinction is fundamental to how we deliver certifiable, safety-critical solutions.

In aerospace, Verification and Validation are often used interchangeably but they serve very different purposes. Understanding this distinction is key to ensuring both compliance and safety across the lifecycle of an aircraft or system. Let’s simplify it. Validation: Are we building the right system? Verification: Did we build the system right?

The upcoming EASA Part-IS regulations (EU 2022/1645 & 2023/203) mandate that DOA, POA, and Part-145 organizations adopt an Information Security Management System (ISMS). This isn’t just compliance, it ensures that digital disruptions don’t ripple into safety, production, or maintenance. The framework follows principles akin to ISO 27001: defined processes, roles, asset-risk mapping, reporting, and continuous improvement. Part-IS becomes effective in October 2025 for DOA/POA, and 2026 for Part-145 entities.

Great news to share: EASA has formally adopted SORA V2.5 via its new AMC & GM under ED Decision 2025/018/R, making the updated methodology an acceptable means of compliance for “specific” UAS operations in Europe

At first glance, aircraft certification standards and beer festivals couldn’t be further apart. But look closer, and you’ll find surprising parallels...

A big step in rigor comes at SW Level C. Low-level requirements must be created, full traceability (system → code → tests) established, and development standards (requirements, design, code, model) demonstrated. Verification expands to worst-case execution time and absence of run-time errors. Statement coverage is required. Independence is optional like adding a door camera for extra safety. Many teams also introduce separate verification groups here to prepare for higher levels.

Where philosophies align, and what it means for global aviation. In Part 1, we explored how FAA and EASA differ in certification philosophy and their level of technical involvement. Now let’s turn to what they have in common and how they make global product certification possible despite their differences.

In aviation, development of complex aircraft systems is governed not by testing end products but by development assurance. I.e., providing evidence that the system (and software) was developed and tested (verified) properly following a planned approach. The rigor needed for systems depends on the failure effects of the systems, the more critical a failure would be, the more rigor needs to be applied in development. On system level, this is represented by the assignment of a Design Assurance Level (DAL) to systems and items (hardware and software).

Understanding the differences in product certification philosophies. Whether you're developing an aircraft, engine, or system, your design must satisfy one or more national aviation authorities. Two of the most influential are the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the U.S. and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Their approaches to certification differ significantly especially in terms of philosophy and involvement.

In our corner of aviation, capability is forged on programs, design reviews, and audits, not in a lecture hall. On‑the‑job training is where engineers learn how the small details decide airworthiness. We often meet brilliant engineers (new to aviation) who read the standards or attend a course and feel ready. Then the real project starts and pitfalls appear late, when they’re most expensive to fix...

On 22 July 2025, EASA published two new proposed Means of Compliance (MoC) for operations under Specific Assurance and Integrity Level III (SAIL III) in the specific category: OSO #2 - Specification of materials and configuration control. OSO #8 - Flight Manual. These MoCs are open for consultation until 12 September 2025 via the EASA Comment Response Tool.